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SPATIUM ENTITATIVUM. 
LEIBNIZ’S NOTES ON JOHANN HEINRICH BISTERFELD* 
ABSTRACT: With striking parallels to Leibniz’s later thought, Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld 
(1605-1655) describes the world as united by a nexus of universal harmony – an idea 
ultimately motivated by epistemological premises. The young Leibniz, accordingly, is an 
enthusiastic reader of Bisterfeld’s texts – while at the same time critically modifying his 
ideas: The universal harmony that epistemology postulates is, for Leibniz, not based on 
physical space and the mechanical interactions taking place there, but rather on the 
non-physical spatium entitativum identified with God himself. Thus nuancing the 
relationship between metaphysics and physics, Leibniz anticipates a key problem of his 
later thought. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Wie später Leibniz, beschreibt Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld 
(1605-1655) die Welt als durch einen universalen Nexus der Harmonie verbunden –
und fundiert das letztlich in epistemologischen Prämissen. Der junge Leibniz ist 
dementsprechend ein begeisterter Leser seiner Texte, akzentuiert Bisterfelds Ideen 
dabei aber kritisch: Ihm zufolge stiftet nicht etwa die mechanische Wechselwirkung 
im physischen Raum die epistemologisch postulierte universelle Harmonie, sondern 
ein nichtphysisches, mit Gott selbst identifiziertes spatium entitativum. Indem er so 
das Verhältnis von Physik und Metaphysik neu austariert, nimmt er eines der 
entscheidenden Probleme seines späteren Denkens vorweg. 
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This article concerns the enigmatic term spatium entitativum, which 
Leibniz introduces in his marginal notes on Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld’s 
metaphysical manual Primae Philosophiae Seminarium, published in 
1657. These notes apparently date back to Leibniz’s student years (about 
1663-1665),1 and neither Bisterfeld, nor the spatium entitativum ever 
reappear in his later writings. However, these notes offer an intriguing 
insight into the way the young philosopher reads the texts of other authors: 
combining a clear-sighted exegesis with critical originality, in a manner that 
seems to anticipate his philosophical approach in later years. 
Leibniz, as Maria Rosa Antognazza stressed, was not merely “a 
progressive westerner stranded in an intellectual backwater”.2 While he was 
very well read in and deeply influenced by contemporary Western 
European thought, he was also a native in the colourful intellectual world 
of all the diverse pre-Cartesian philosophical schools still alive in the 
universities and libraries of the seventeenth-century Holy Roman Empire. 
A less well-known example from this panorama is the German 
encyclopaedist Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld (1605-1655), a university 
philosopher and statesman and an adept of the Calvinist school of 
Herborn, who, like his father-in-law Johann Heinrich Alsted, spent most 
of his adult life in the service of the Bethlen and Rákóczi princes of 
Transylvania. Beginning with Willy Kabitz’s seminal work from 1909, 
scholars have noted numerous parallels between Leibniz and Bisterfeld.3  
                                                            
1 “Seine knapp gehaltenen Randbemerkungen könnten schon in die Jahre 1663 und 
1664 gehören” (A VI.1, XV). “Die beiden Schriften Bisterfelds hat Leibniz schon in seiner 
Leipziger Studienzeit besessen (vgl. I,4, 681). Zumindest die erste [Seminarium] hat er 
schon vor dem Einbinden gelesen und gleichzeitig mit Bemerkungen versehen”; he quotes 
it in his marginal notes on Daniel Stahl from 1665/65 (A VI.2, 548, cf. ibid. p. 543). 
2 M.R. Antognazza, Leibniz. An Intellectual Biography, Cambridge, University Press, 
2009, p. 9. 
3 W. Kabitz, Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklungsgeschichte 
eines Systems, Heidelberg, Winter, 1909, p. 6 sqq; L.E. Loemker, “Leibniz and the Herborn 
Encyclopedists”, in I. Leclerc (ed.), The Philosophy of Leibniz and the Modern World, Nashville, 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1973, p. 276-297; M. Mugnai, “Der Begriff der Harmonie als 
metaphysische Grundlage der Kombinatorik und Logik bei Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld und 
Leibniz”, Studia Leibnitiana, 5, 1973, p. 43-73; M. R. Antognazza, “Bisterfeld and immeatio. 
Origins of a key concept in the early modern doctrine of universal harmony”, in M. Mulsow (ed.), 
Spätrenaissance-Philosophie in Deutschland. Entwürfe zwischen Humanismus und 
Konfessionalisierung, okkulten Traditionen und Schulmetaphysik, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2009, p. 57-
83. On Bisterfeld and the Herborn school in general cf. also: J. Kvacsala, “Johann Heinrich 
Bisterfeld”, in Ungarische Revue, 13, 1893, p. 40-59, 174-197; P. Rossi, Clavis Universalis. Arti 
della memoria e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz, Bologna, Mulino, 1983, trans. S. Clucas, 
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Leibniz’s notes on Bisterfeld are too scarce and too early to clearly 
discern which ideas Leibniz directly took from Bisterfeld. His admiration 
for the Transylvanian philosopher, however, is clear,4 and there are enough 
similarities to classify Bisterfeld at least as one typical example of a decisive 
layer in Leibniz’s background.5 These parallels are not limited to 
philosophy in the narrower sense: The overall intellectual programme of 
Bisterfeld’s milieu, Martin Mulsow shows, comprised metaphysics and 
logics as well as theological apologetics, pedagogy and political reform and 
thus was not entirely dissimilar to Leibniz’s.6 
In Bisterfeld’s metaphysics and natural philosophy, we find strong 
parallels to Leibniz: For Bisterfeld as for Leibniz, Massimo Mugnai points 
out, the “universal relation and connection of all things to all things” is a key 
motive.7 The universe, for Bisterfeld, is characterized by a “panharmony and 
universal communication of things”,8 in such a way that some sort of 
                                                                                                                                           
Logic and the Art of Memory. The Quest for a Universal Language, London, Continuum, 2000; M. 
Mulsow, “Sociabilitas. Zu einem Kontext der Campanella-Rezeption im 17. Jahrhundert”, in 
Bruniana & Campanelliana, 1, 1995, p. 205-232; Id., “Bisterfelds Cabala. Zur Bedeutung des 
Antisozianismus für die Spätrenaissancephilosophie”, in Id., Spätrenaissance-Philosophie, p. 13-41. 
Works by Bisterfeld cited in this article include: Phosphorus Catholicus, seu artis meditandi 
epitome, Leiden, Verbiest, 1657; Primae philosophiae seminarium, ed. Adrian Heereboord, Leiden, 
Gaasbeeck, 1657; Bisterfeldius redivivus, seu oper[a] posthum[a] Joh. Henrici Bisterfeldi, 2 vols., The 
Hague, Vlacq, 1661. 
4 The Seminarium is a “praeclarissimum opusculum, et cui par in hoc genere non 
vidi”, the Phosphorus an “ingeniosissimus libellous” (notes on the title pages, A VI.1, 151 / 
160), its author is “praeter morem compendiographorum solidissimu[s]” (A. VI.1, 199).  
5 A similarly cautious assessment of Bisterfeld’s role is given by D. Rutherford, 
Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, Cambridge, University Press, 1998, p. 37. 
6 Mulsow (“Sociabilitas”, p. 207-208) sees Bisterfeld in the context of the Protestant 
millenaristic movement eponymous for R. H. Popkin’s The Third Force in Seventeenth-
Century Thought, Leiden, Brill, 1992. “Für Popkin zieht sich ein roter Faden von den 
Überlegungen, die Joseph Mede zu einer infalliblen Auslegung der biblischen Prophetien 
angestellt hat, zur Kabbala-Rezeption und dem Platonismus von Cambridge, von den 
missionarischen Aktivitäten Hartlibs, Durys und Comenius’ zu den spiritualistischen 
Ideen von Leibniz und Newton”. The core of the movement is “[die] universal[e] 
Erneuerung und Versöhnung des Weltkreises als Vorbereitung auf [das] Zeitenende”. A 
felicitous characterization of Leibniz’s overall scope of interest is offered in Antognazza’s 
Biography, esp. in the introduction p. 1-14. On the Herborn School and the Third Force 
Author Comenius cf. ibid., p. 30-46. 
7 “universell[e] Beziehung und Verbindung ‘aller Dinge mit allen Dingen’”, M. 
Mugnai, “Harmonie”, p. 50. Mugnai quotes Leibniz’s Dissertatio de arte combinatoria 
(1666): “quae [sc. Bisterfeld’s Phosophorus Catholicus] tota fundatur in immeatione et 
περιχωρήσει, ut vocat, universali omnium in omnibus” (A VI.1, 199, p. 22 sq). On 
immeatio, cf. Antognazza, “Bisterfeld and immeatio”. 
8 “Panharmonia et catholica communicatio”, Seminarium, p. 89. 
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connection can be found from any being to any other being. With a 
metaphor that anticipates Leibniz’s imagery – he ultimately borrows it from 
Campanella and Bacon9 – Bisterfeld even states that all beings, living or not, 
‘perceive’ one another. As in Leibniz’s mature thought, Bisterfeld points 
out that each being has its potentia activa, without which it would be “idle 
and vain” and unable to enter into unio et communio with other beings. 
“Thus, it would be a useless member in the commonwealth of beings”, 
Leibniz carries on Bisterfeld’s ‘sociological’ imagery in the margin10 – his 
interest in these metaphors again seems to prove the common ground 
between the two authors even beyond philosophy.11 For Bisterfeld, this 
universal cohesion of the world is expressed in the absence of vacuum, a 
fuga vacui causing most physical phenomena.12 
Equally resonant of Leibniz are Bisterfeld’s epistemology and 
pedagogy: Based on innate species of things, and patterns of thought, it is 
possible to reduce all concepts to a catalogue of primitive concepts.13 Thus, 
by induction and deduction one can proceed from any given concept to 
any other.14 From here, it is not a far way to Leibniz’s own decisively 
aprioristic epistemology and his ars inveniendi. 
There is yet a more decisive parallel between the two thinkers. Neither 
for Bisterfeld, nor for Leibniz, the two fields mentioned, metaphysics and 
epistemology, are independent of each other. Quite on the contrary, 
Thomas Leinkauf points out, Bisterfeld’s epistemology implies as a 
necessary premise that also the ontological structures of the world are 
rational.15 “Unless the polymorphic and diverse multitude of things can be 
                                                            
9 Mulsow, “Sociabilitas”, p. 222. 
10 Bisterfeld: “Secus foret otiosum et frustra”; Leibniz: “et esset membrum 
Reipublicae Entium inutile”, Seminarium, p. 65, and A VI.1, p. 155. 
11 Bisterfeld, when explaining that the ‘natural place’ of a being coincides with his 
role in the universe: “Bonum enim publicum seu totius, non repugnat bono privato seu 
partium” (Aphorismi Physici, p. 155, in: Bisterfeldius redivivus I). Cf. also Bisterfeld’s 
remarks on the ‘symbiotic’ character of all beings, Seminarium, p. 35-36. Another point 
where Leibniz’s interest in this imagery becomes visible is his comment on Seminarium p. 
103, A VI.1, 156, and on Seminarium p. 161-162, A VI. 159 n. 37. 
12 Bisterfeld, Aphorismi Physici, p. 118 in Bisterfeldius Redivivus I. 
13 Artificium Definiendi Catholicum p. 4; 15-19, in Bisterfeldius Redivivus I. Cf. 
Rossi, Logic, p. 142-144. 
14 Bisterfeld, Phosphorus Catholicus, p. 23-27. 
15 Th. Leinkauf, “Diversitas identitate compensata. Ein Grundproblem in Leibniz’ 
Denken und seine Voraussetzungen in der Frühen Neuzeit” in Studia Leibnitiana, 28, 
1996, p. 58-83; 29, 1997, p. 81-102, here p. 88-92.  
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reduced to some well-ordered community, then to paucity, and ultimately 
to unity, there will be no order between them, but mere confusion and 
chaos, and no certain cognition”.16 This principle is to be found in the first 
chapter of Bisterfeld’s metaphysical Seminarium, and the rest of the work 
seems to be structured in order to fulfil this epistemological postulate: The 
unity and ordered structure of the world is the necessary condition of 
possibility for its cognition. While Leibniz’s metaphysics certainly cannot 
be deduced from his epistemology in a similarly unilinear manner – 
“Leibniz’s philosophy is not”, Daniel Garber aptly points out, “a linear 
argument, with a beginning, middle, and end” –, I do believe that at least 
one of the many argumentative threads in this “complex of interrelated and 
mutually reflecting positions, principles, and arguments”17 is closely akin to 
Bisterfeld’s approach: Panperception and fuga vacui are the way Bisterfeld’s 
universe fulfils his postulate of a universal unity and order, in the same way 
as the pre-stabilized reflection of the universe in the individual substance is 
the metaphysical counterpart to Leibniz’s notio completa logic. 
So far, we have been able to see quite a lot of parallels: Both authors are 
interested in Universal Science, postulate an harmonious order, discernible 
a priori, of the universe, and model, as the capstone of their philosophical 
system, their notion of being in such a way that it fulfils these 
epistemological demands, so that – as Thomas Leinkauf summarizes – 
reality can be equalled to harmony.18 – But where are the differences 
between the two authors? What does Leibniz ‘make’ of Bisterfeld’s account 
of an animate world? 
In Bisterfeld, metaphysical principles find a direct expression in the 
universe. The impossibility of vacuum, for example, is a direct consequence 
of the metaphysical principle of universal coherence and harmony.19 And 
even substantial forms and (non-rational) souls can be explained 
                                                            
16 “Nisi enim omnigena omnimodaque rerum multitudo ad ordinatam quandam 
communitatem, ac proinde ad paucitatem tandemque ad unitatem, revocari queat, nullus 
erit earum ordo, sed mera confusio et chaos; earundemque certa cognitio nulla”. Bisterfeld, 
Seminarium, p. 2. 
17 D. Garber, “Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years”, in K. 
Okruhlik-J. R. Brown, The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster-
Tokio, Springer, 1985, p. 27-130.  
18 Th. Leinkauf, “Harmonie und Realität. Eine systematische Einführung”, in Id.-S. 
Meier-Oeser, Harmonie und Realität. Beiträge zur Philosophie des späten Leibniz (“Studia 
Leibnitiana”, Sonderhefte 51), Tübingen, Steiner, 2017, p. 9-22. 
19 Bisterfeld, Seminarium, p. 36. 
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mechanically, as a light and subtle sort of matter, whose fluctuation keeps 
the coarser bodies moving.20 It is in this context that Leibniz’s notes 
critically nuance Bisterfeld’s argument by introducing the enigmatic notion 
of spatium entitativum, ‘entitative space’. It appears thrice, scattered 
through the whole work, in Leibniz’s notes on Bisterfeld’s Primae 
Philosophiae Seminarium, a metaphysical manual with a highly systematic 
and deductive structure. 
The first note in which Leibniz uses the term concerns vacuum. For 
Bisterfeld as for Leibniz, harmony is an essential property of things. 
“Everything coheres in a perfectly close and delightful manner”, Bisterfeld 
therefore states in one of the paragraphs in question, “neither in the 
physical, nor in the spiritual world, there is any vacuum whatsoever”.21 
Leibniz feels the need to add clarity here: “sc. entitative, licet corporaliter” 
– “that is to say, [there is no vacuum] entitatively, [on the other hand] 
corporeally – it is not out of the question. For there is no entitative space 
except for the indivisible God”.22 The ‘indivisible God’ is ‘entitative space’ 
– how should we understand this? 
When the term appears for the second time, it relates to the locality of 
things. An important principle for both Leibniz and Bisterfeld is the unity 
of every being – every being is necessarily one being. Bisterfeld draws the 
following conclusions from this principle: “Every being is present to itself. 
No being is absent from itself. No being is distant from itself. Therefore, it 
is indeed contradictory to state that one and the same finite being, for 
example an angel or a man, is at one and the same time in several adequate 
places”. Leibniz remarks at this point: “Wrong. Entitative space is one 
thing, corporeal space another”.23 The unity of every single being, for him, 
implies that it cannot be at different places in the entitative sense – 
physically that is not absolutely impossible. 
                                                            
20 Bisterfeld, Aphorismi Physici, p. 143-146, in Bisterfeldius Redivivus I.  
21 “Hinc, nullum in natura, vel spirituali, vel corporea, datur vacuum, sed omnia 
arctissime suavissime inter se cohaerent”, Seminarium p. 36. 
22 “sc. entitative, licet corporaliter. Non [e]n[im] datur Spatium Entis, nisi Deus 
indivisibilis. Et nescio quid extra, principium Existentiae, ubi Consistentia est coniunctio 
cum certa distantia in Spatio Entitativo”, A VI.1 153 n. 8.  
23 Bisterfeld: “Ex unitate oritur nobilis quaedam nobilissimorum axiomatum sylva [p. 
69] […] VII. Ratione praesentiae. 1. Omne ens est praesens sibi ipsi. 2. Nullum ens abest a 
seipso. Unde revera contradictorium est, unum idemque ens finitum, v. g. Angelum vel 
hominem, esse uno eodemque tempore in diversis locis adaequatis [p. 81 f]”. Leibniz’s 
note: “falso. aliud est spatium Entitativum, aliud Corporale”. A VI.1, 155 with n. 21 and 
VI.2, 520. 
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The third example gives us another, still mysterious hint of how to 
understand the term. When Bisterfeld defines ‘existence’ as “the mode of a 
being in virtue of which it is really to be found in the rerum natura”, 
Leibniz’s marginal note translates this rerum natura as the spatium 
entitativum.24 As we see here, spatium entitativum, in some sense, seems to 
mean the totality of all existing things; in other contexts, we saw above, it 
can be equalled with God himself. Leibniz nowhere provides a clearer and 
less ambiguous definition – these are his personal notes, after all! Only a 
contextualization of the term can help us to understand it better. 
Entitativus is an adjective derived from entitas, used in scholastic 
literature since at least Duns Scotus. The context in which it typically 
appears is the actus entitativus that Scotus, in the dualism of actuality and 
potentiality, ascribes to the totally unformed materia prima: While 
Thomas Aquinas25 and others contend that prime matter is sheer 
potentiality, potentia pura, and has no actuality whatsoever, Scotus 
differentiates between actus formalis and actus entitativus: Clearly, 
unformed matter by definition has no claim to the former status, but since 
it is a positive entity, it can be described as actus entitativus.26 The same 
distinction is made, for example, by Leibniz’s scholastic reference Suárez,27 
and is echoed in one of his own manuscripts.28 The common ground with 
the notes on Bisterfeld, however, seems to be limited to the lexical level. 
More parallels to Leibniz’s usage of the term – and even a spatium 
entitativum – can be found in the terminology of Erhard Weigel 
(1625-1699), 29 professor of mathematics in Jena. While for us today the 
only surviving direct source on this is Weigel’s 1673 work Corporis 
Pansophici Pantologia, published after the presumed date of Leibniz’s notes 
on Bisterfeld, Leibniz studied with Weigel in Jena in summer 1663 and 
apparently became acquainted with his terminology, which he cites already 
                                                            
24 Bisterfeld 161 f: “Existentia est modus entis per quem revera est in rerum natura”; 
emphasized by Leibniz, comment “scilicet Spatum Entitativum, aut vita communis 
m[etaphy]sica”. A. VI.1, 159 with n. 37 and VI.2, 520. 
25 Cf. the Index Thomisticus, <http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/it/index.age>, 
s.v. potentia pura, for a complete overview (retrieved 2nd November 2018). 
26 Duns Scotus, Sent. II.12.1, Opera Omnia XII, Paris, Vives, 1893, 563. 
27 F. Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae XV, 9, 5-6, Venice, Colosinus, 1605, p. 391. 
For a more critical reception of the concept in the 17th century, see the Collegium 
Conimbrigense’s commentary In Physicam Aristotelis, I.9.3.1, vol. I, Cologne, Zetzner, 
1625, p. 199. 
28 De distinctionibus seu fundamentis divisionum, 1682-1696, A VI.4 B, 1147. 
29 I owe this decisive information to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article! 
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in the following year.30 The typical context in which entitative is used by 
Weigel is the differentiated subdivision of terms – a subject to which large 
parts of the work are devoted: If there are several aspects according to 
which a term can be subdivided, entitative denotes the most general one. 
The relationship between prior, posterior, and simul, for example, may be 
understood entitative, quotitative, quandicative, and ubicative. While 
‘quotitative’, ‘quandicative’, and ‘ubicative priority’ refer to numbers, time 
and space (1 precedes 2, past precedes future, one thing can be placed above 
or below another), ‘entitative’ priority or posteriority refers to the entities 
themselves, meaning that the being of one thing is “either presupposed by, 
or follows from, or is simultaneously implied” by that of another. “In this 
sense the cause is prior in the interaction of nature, the effect posterior, 
even in case they are simultaneous with respect to time and space”.31 
Entitative, in Weigel, thus denotes generality: Prior entitative is a thing that 
has precedence not in this or that aspect, but by its whole essence. This 
helps us to understand Weigel’s spatium entiativum morale. Here, as well, 
we will see, the word entitativum has an abstractive role. 
An ens civile, or morale, in Weigel’s definition, is an entity that 
“depends in its being on a consensual attribution by humans leading a 
social life” – that is, institutions and structures of the society.32 While such 
entities “from a formal point of view add nothing solid to the interaction of 
natural things” or constitute measurable material facts, these entia moralia 
“often have a far greater effect on our actions than the natural things 
themselves, as those who break laws even against their will experience 
frequently”.33 Now, as our intellect “understands everything by an analogy 
                                                            
30 “Et Clarissimus Weigelius, Prof. Mathematum Jenensis, Praeceptor, Fautorque 
meus colendus tria summa genera Entitum constituit: Naturale, Morale, et Notionale [...], 
et uti actioni naturali seu motui Spatium substratum sit, spatium quoddam morale esse 
Statum, in quo quasi motus naturalis exerceatur”: Specimen quaestionum philosophicarum 
ex jure collectarum, Leipzig, Wittigau, 1664, A VI.1, 94. Leibniz’s other citations in this 
work usually name a specific book and not just the scholar – so he seems to have heard 
about Weigel’s terminology orally. 
31 “Entitative, quod essendi consequentia vel praesupponitur, vel sequitur, vel 
concurrit. Ita causa prior est in naturae commercio, causatum posterius, etsi tempore et 
loco sint simul”: E. Weigel, Corporis Pansophici Pantologia, Jena, Bauhofer [1673], p. 74, 
similarly ibid., p. 76, 79. 
32 “Ens civile est quod habet essentiam civilem, s. quod in esse suo dependet a 
consensuali hominum Socialem vitam ducentium imputation”, ibid., p. 20. 
33 “[...] licet illa, si formaliter spectentur, naturalium rerum commercio nihil solidi 
superaddant”; “nostris actionibus efficacissime imparant, et effectum in vita communi 
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to body, [...] it perceives also this work, which has been constituted 
willingly by a second, moral, creation, as some world of its own, for 
distinction sake termed moral [...]”. The entirety of moral things thus 
presents us a spatium entitativum morale, “a moral entitative space, [...] in 
which moral things are placed and are seen to interact with one another, 
according to a before and after commonly called dignity”.34 This social 
universe, just like Aristotle’s physical world, is subdivided into several 
spheres of different rank, has an empyreum (the ecclesiastic sphere) as well 
as a sky and a sublunar world (political and private spheres). As we see, 
space here is a metaphor for a system of a very different sort than the 
physical universe – a moral one –, and entitative is the verbal signal for the 
level of abstraction that makes this metaphorical use of the term possible: 
As we deal not with physical, but with entitative space, therefore not with 
bodies, but with entities as entities, we can also find a ‘spatial’ order for the 
non-physical entia civilia. So far, Leibniz seems to follow Weigel. 
Concerning the notion of space, important developments had taken 
place in the renaissance tradition that was well known to Bisterfeld, 
Weigel, and Leibniz:35 Thinkers like Tommaso Campanella, Francesco 
Patrizi, and Pierre Gassendi began to regard space as a substantial being of 
its own, a primum factum and precondition to material creatures, as whose 
‘container’ it functioned, its receptaculum, as Leibniz himself put it36 – a 
concept that anticipates Newton’s concept of absolute space, which 
                                                                                                                                           
multo maiorem saepe, quam ipsae res naturales, habent, quod ii, qui peccarunt, etiam 
inviti saepius experiuntur”: E. Weigel, Universi corporis pansophici caput summum, Jena, 
Bauhofer, 1673, fol. a2 v. 
34 “Quemadmodum igitur intellectus alias omnia per proportionem ad corpus 
apprehendit, quod in Pantognosia prolixius explicabimus; ita quoque hoc morali quadam 
creatione secunda per voluntatem ita constitutum opus ceu pecularem quendam 
MUNDUM, disctinctionis gratia dictum MORALEM, [...] concipit”. “Abstractus autem 
Entium civilium Complexus et Commercium illud s. consortium personarum et rerum 
civilium praecise conceptum, qs. Spatium entitativum morale largitur, h. e. Statum illum 
naturalem Vitam Civilem dictum, in quo res morales locum habere et secundum Prius et 
Posterius, quod vulgo dicitur DIGNITATE, se mutuo concernere concipiuntur”: Weigel, 
Pantologia, p. 21 sq. 
35 As early as 1677 (Spatium et Motus revera relationes, 1677 (?), A VI. 4 C, 1968-
1970), Leibniz is an advocate of a ‘relational’ rather than an ‘absolute’ understanding of 
space, but the container theory of space is mentioned several times in his earlier writings: 
Letter to Thomasius, April 1669, A II.1 (2006), 34; De origine rerum ex formis, April 
1676, A VI.3, 519; Definitiones cogiationesque metaphysicae, 1678-81, A VI.4 B, 1397; De 
mundo praesenti, 1684-1686, A VI.4 B, 1509. 
36 De mundo praesenti, 1684-1686, A VI.4 B, 1509. 
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Leibniz later so vigorously attacked.37 Given this premise, it seems natural 
to describe also the totality of non-physical entities as situated in a 
non-geometrical ‘container’ analogous to physical space – Tommaso 
Campanella’s mundus archetypus and mentalis, for example, function in a 
similar way.38 Accordingly, Weigel’s and Leibniz’s spatium entitativum 
seems to be a ‘container’ in which things are situated related to each other 
not according to three-dimensional geometry, but according to a different, 
abstract system. Leibniz and Weigel, however, use this spatial metaphor in 
different contexts: Weigel’s spatium entitativum morale denotes the 
relationship of social, institutional entities according to social parameters. 
Leibniz’s spatium entitativum, on the other hand, seems to denote the 
relationship of creatures according to their original concept in the mind of 
God and thus their own innermost nature. We remember that social and 
metaphysical categories are very close to one another for Leibniz at that 
period. But nonetheless, this seems to be the point where Leibniz parts 
ways with Weigel and develops his argument in a more original way. In our 
attempt to make sense of his notes on Bisterfeld, we are now thrown back 
towards the scarce and dubious hints found in his own work. 
As it seems, Leibniz here tries to reconcile his theological and scientific 
views with Bisterfeld’s metaphysical system. As for his differentiation 
between ‘corporeal’ and ‘entitative’ vacuums, Hubertus Busche argues that 
a physical vacuum is the necessary precondition for the atomism Leibniz 
held back then:39 By admitting to a vacuum on the ‘corporeal’ level, but 
rejecting it on the ‘entitative level’, he can uphold an atomistic conception 
of the physical universe under Bisterfeld’s premises. Concerning the 
problem of multipresence, it seems plausible that both Bisterfeld and 
Leibniz have Eucharistic theology in mind. It is a premise of the Catholic 
and the Lutheran doctrines of the Eucharist that a given being – the body 
                                                            
37 Th. Leinkauf, “Der Begriff des Raumes in der Diskussion um 1600”, Kunsttexte, 1, 
2011, <https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/handle/18452/8282>, passim (retrieved 2nd November 
2018). 
38 These two being the hierarchically higher analogous counterparts to the more 
geometrical mundus mathematicus, mundes materialis, and mundus situalis: Tommaso 
Campanella, Universalis philosophiae seu metaphysicarum rerum iuxta propria dogmata, 
Paris 1638, lib. 1, cap. 1, art. 11, p. 248-249. Cf. the summary in E. Grant, Much Ado about 
Nothing. Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution, 
Cambridge, University Press, 1981, p. 194. 
39 H. Busche, Leibniz’ Weg ins perspektivische Universum. Eine Harmonie im 
Zeitalter der Berechnung, Hamburg, Meiner, 1997, p. 147. 
Spatium entitativum. Leibniz’s Notes on J. H. Bisterfeld 
 127 
of Christ – can be present at several places simultaneously. In other 
sections of his book, Bisterfeld explicitly deduces from his philosophical 
premises the rejection of this and other theologoumena adverse to his 
Calvinist creed;40 the Rome-friendly Lutheran Leibniz seems to suspect 
such an intention also here and accordingly modifies Bisterfeld’s argument 
in a way that is more compatible with his own beliefs.41 
Leibniz’s early ideas on Eucharistic theology – spelled out in 
manuscripts a few years later, 1668-1669 – do indeed help us to understand 
in what sense rerum natura and even Deus indivisibilis can be equalled with 
spatium entitativum. The substance of a being, Leibniz argues there, is 
something more than the body that we see: Substances, according to 
Aristotle, are entities that have a principle of action in themselves; bodies 
need to be moved from outside; therefore, in order to be a complete 
substance, a body must be united to a mind. This union, Leibniz thinks, is 
what changes in Eucharistic Transsubstantation: The bodies placed on the 
altar, originally linked to the idea of bread and wine in the Divine mind, are 
instead linked in the act of consecration to the mind of Christ and thus 
become His body and blood, without any change of their outward 
appearance. The same body of Christ can be simultaneously present on 
several altars (as well as in heaven), because all of these hosts and chalices 
are linked to the same mind. In Deo sunt – ‘God contains’ (!) – infinitae 
Ideae realiter diversae,42 each of whom determines the essence of a different 
being. I think that this is precisely what Leibniz means by spatium 
entitativum: An ‘ideal topography’ of different ideas in the mind of God, 
which – rather than the physical differentation – determines what a thing 
really, substantially, ‘entitatively’ is. 
Specific scientific and theological problems here lead to a fundamental 
shift in the notion of being. Leibniz, it seems, reads Bisterfeld’s work 
neither as a quarry for isolated ideas, nor as a manual of philosophical 
                                                            
40 Cf. the parallel account on locality, Seminarium, p. 176-177. Bisterfeld often has 
theological controversies in mind when building his philosophical arguments, cf. ibid., 64, 
p. 110-111. 
41 Eucharistic theology often offers Leibniz an opportunity to develop new 
metaphysical ideas. For a later example, cf. Th. Leinkauf, “The vinculum substantiale and 
the Impact of Metaphysics in Leibniz’ Late Philosophy”, in Id.- Meier-Oeser, Harmonie 
und Realität, p. 179-199. 
42 Cf. the Demonstrationes Catholicae, 1668 (?), A VI.1, 508-514. A summary and 
interpretation of the Eucharistic theology is given by Ch. Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics. 
Its Origins and Development, Cambridge, University Press, 2001, p. 83-93. 
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commonplaces. Rather, he is enthusiastically interested in Bisterfeld’s 
system as a whole – but adopts his argument under premises that are very 
much his own. “There is no space of being except for the indivisible God. 
And I do not know what else is the principle of existence, if consistency is a 
connection with a certain distance in entitative space”.43 Existentia and 
consistentia are Bisterfeld’s own systematically defined technical terms 
describing the relational nature of all beings.44 This shows how accurately 
Leibniz reconstructs Bisterfeld’s argument, even using terminology specific 
to its author – and then continues by introducing his own idiosyncratic 
concept: He follows Bisterfeld’s argument for a universal cohesion of all 
things, but places this cohesion in ‘entitative’, not in corporeal space. 
Leibniz here strictly separates metaphysics and physics. The 
metaphysical unity and harmony of the world necessarily required for its 
cognition does no longer directly lead to a physical cohesion. Bisterfeld’s 
metaphysical argument does not, in Leibniz’s view, necessarily entail the 
impossibility of a physical vacuum; according to Bisterfeld’s premises 
explained so far, Leibniz thinks, it “is not entirely out of the question” that 
it exists. Leibniz emphatically subscribes to Bisterfeld’s epistemological 
postulate of the unity of the world, but objects that it must be fulfilled in a 
different, non-physical manner, which he baptizes with the awkward, 
untranslatable, and mysterious scholastic barbarism entitative. 
Already here, therefore, Leibniz seems to anticipate some aspects of a 
project that we can trace more clearly from the late 1660s until the very last 
years of his life: He tries to combine a mechanistic physics with a 
metaphysics allowing for an almighty God and immortal souls and capable 
to serve as the philosophical fundament for Christian dogma. His 
argumentative strategy in this endeavour seems to be the same for most of 
his life – from his Confessio naturae contra atheistas (1668/1669) through 
the Discours de Métaphysique (1686)45 until his last letter to Clarke in 
171646: He follows the mechanistic postulate to keep the interactions of 
bodies free of all supernatural – and indeed of any non-physical – 
influence, but then tries to prove that this mechanistic world is possible 
only under the premise of the existence of spiritual substances: God and 
                                                            
43 See above, n. 26. 
44 Consistentia, est entitas, per quam ens est ad Ens; per quam ens cum aliquo et 
respective esse concipitur. (Seminarium, p. 31). 
45 Discours de Métaphysique X, A VI.4 B, 1543. 
46 G VII, p. 417 sq. 
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created souls.47 Physics and metaphysics are two different, parallel but 
independent ‘realms’,48 which never interfere with one another – but the 
physical realm is ultimately grounded in the metaphysical one. This 
approach also allows him to give older philosophical concepts – most 
famously the scholastic Substantial Form – a new, in his view, more 
rational interpretation. 
Though we cannot know precisely how much of this concept was 
already behind Leibniz’s notes on Bisterfeld, several points are strikingly 
similar: Introducing a strict separation between physics and metaphysics, 
Leibniz, with recourse to Weigel’s terminology, reconstructs in a free, 
eclectic manner the system of an older philosopher, preserving his 
metaphysical outlook and his epistemological premises, but at the same 
time creating more room both for Christian dogma and mechanistic 
physics. While the specific form of the argument, the notion of spatium 
entitativum, was determined by problems only relevant for the 
catholisizing atomist that Leibniz was during this short phase of his 
biography, the core of the problem remains in the very centre of his 
philosophy for the rest of his life. 
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